INTRODUCTION
Prosecuting and deterring international cartels increasingly occupies the time and energy of competition authorities around the world. In order to provide appropriate policy instruments, policymakers have had to address a range of issues: corporate amnesty policies, extraterritoriality, building antitrust institutional capacity in developing countries, and multinational agreements for competition authorities to cooperate and share information. In a similar vein, some countries have eliminated or limited previously existing antitrust exemptions for cooperation among private firms for exporting goods and services; others, however, have steadfastly insisted on the importance of maintaining these exemptions.
With increasing consensus, both in favor of freer international trade and in opposition to price fixing and market division agreements, these exemptions have come under criticism over the last decade. By 1991, academics were beginning to call for a change in policy toward export cartels. "[Export exemptions from antitrust laws] authorize firms to collaborate to engage in anticompetitive behavior in foreign markets, at the expense of other countries' consumers and producers, in a manner that would be unlawful if undertaken at home."
1 Spencer Weber Waller, the preeminent expert in this area, wrote that "the absence of international regulation pertaining to the use of export cartels leaves a conspicuous gap in the enforcement of competition norms."
2 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") voiced similar criticism, & BUS. 98, 99 (1989) [hereinafter Waller, U.S. Antitrust Ambivalence] (arguing that while the "shining success" of U.S. antitrust law in the latter part of the twentieth century is our strong stance against international cartels that harm U.S. consumers, we have a "poor history of responding to the challenges posed by single-country export cartels").
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief overview of the motivations for export cartel exemptions. We then turn in Section II to the current policy debate about these exemptions and discuss the positions of different countries with respect to continued exemptions. Section III gives a detailed discussion of the types of export cartel exemptions and the changing status of these exemptions around the world. We survey the antitrust laws in fifty-five countries, report on how they currently treat export cartels, and examine whether and why their policies have changed over the past decade. The conclusion draws on this analysis to offer relevant policy recommendations.
I. MOTIVATION FOR EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR PREVALENCE A. MOTIVATION
As the country with the strongest and longest standing antitrust laws, the United States also adopted the earliest "export exemption" to its antitrust laws in 1918. 9 At the time, Congress was primarily concerned with two factors that might inhibit exports: (1) the inability of U.S. firms to work together in representing their own interests vis-à-vis powerful foreign cartels, and (2) the high fixed costs of exporting, which would be particularly burdensome to small firms. 10 Although there was a great deal of controversy about such legislation (in particular, there were concerns that the firms in these export associations would coordinate to increase domestic prices), the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act ("WPA" or "WebbPomerene") 11 passed and remains in effect today. & ECON. 461, 462-63 (1970) ; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000) .
11. 15 U.S.C. § § 61-66 (2000) . Firms must register with the Federal Trade Commission to form a Webb-Pomerene association.
12. See STAFF REP. TO THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW 1-7 (1967) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REP.] , for an assessment of the WPA. A M. U. INT'L L. REV. [20:785 Over sixty years later, with U.S. firms facing increased competition in global markets, Congress expanded upon the antitrust exemptions provided in the WPA when it passed the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 ("ETC Act"). 13 The ETC Act does not supersede the Webb-Pomerene Act, and at the time of passage of the ETC Act there were thirty-nine registered Webb-Pomerene associations in existence.
14 Congress was motivated, in part, by both the growing U.S. trade deficit and the perceived restrictiveness of U.S. antitrust policies on the ability of U.S. firms to compete abroad. 15 Congress intended that the ETC Act would "increase United States exports of products and services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers and suppliers . . . ." 16 According to Spencer Weber Waller, Congress anticipated that the ETC Act would: 1) encourage the formation of well financed vertically integrated general trading companies along the line of Japanese general trading companies ("sogoshosas") to assist United States exporters with all aspects of the exporting process; 2) allow competitors to jointly exploit market power abroad to offset the power of private cartels and foreign government enterprises; and 3) unleash a wave of export activity by small and medium sized firms previously restrained by uncertainty over the application of U.S. antitrust laws. 'L L. 177, 185 (1987) . The United States has also granted export trading certificates ("ETCs") to a handful of Webb-Pomerene associations, such as the California Dried Fruit Export Trading Co. and Northwest Fruit Exporters, although the member firms are not always identical. Id.
14. See Victor, supra note 1, at 573. The number of Webb-Pomerene associations has declined slowly through the years. Currently, only six WebbPomerene associations are registered with the Federal Trade Commission. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Export Trade Associations Registered Pursuant to the WebbPomerene Act (May 5, 2003) 
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After World War II, other countries around the world adopted stronger provisions against domestic price-fixing; the number of countries with provisions for antitrust exemptions for export activities also increased. For example, Germany's 1958 antitrust law, recently amended, 18 required pure export cartels to go through a notification process, but it exempted them from scrutiny and prosecution "provided they are intended to strengthen the competitive position of the domestic member firms vis-à-vis their foreign competitors."
19
Australia also adopted (and maintains) an explicit exemption with notification. Australia's law recognizes that firms might want to collaborate in order to promote or facilitate exports, but it is concerned about potential harm to domestic consumers: "Most nations exempt export agreements or export associations from competition regulation, and Australia is no exception. Some countries (including the United States and Australia) are, however, concerned that competition-reducing spillover effects be avoided in domestic markets, and require some sort of registration and disclosure of the arrangement." 20 Australia's guidelines justify these exemptions by noting that, "[w]hile size may not be necessary to enhance export opportunities, correct and complete market information is crucial." 21 For example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("ACCC") is "open to arguments that an export consortium has been structured in a way such that domestic competition will not be substantially lessened, so that coordination of supply to overseas markets and information exchanged in an export 18 . See generally infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of Germany's competition law).
19 There is pressure to enact antitrust exemptions only where there are strong antitrust laws. Advocates of these exemptions rely on two types of arguments. First, they fall back on Mercantilist arguments supporting policies that are intended to increase exports and improve the trade balance, even at the expense of domestic consumers and trade partners. 23 For example, Israel's existing antitrust law specifically provides for an exemption for transactions that improve the balance of payments of the state.
24 Second, they argue that these exemptions level the playing field for small firms that would otherwise be disadvantaged in overcoming the hurdles of entering international markets.
B. PREVALENCE OF EXPORT CARTELS
A few numbers can help to put the export cartel exemptions debate in perspective. The best data come from the United States, which requires registration and publishes announcements of its certification of exemptions. Table 1 presents the U.S. data, along with intermittent data from selected other countries. Immediately after passage of the ETC Act, many export trade associations applied for certificates; however, the number of applications leveled out in the mid-1990s. As of 2003, there were 153 valid U.S. export trade certificates. Among the explanations for the modest response by firms to the ETC Act are: [T] he dramatic appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies in the 1980s, the widening trade deficit, the fear of disclosure of confidential business information to the government in order to receive certification, 22. See id. § 3 (noting that the ACCC distinguishes "export agreements" and "export consortia"). "Agreements" relate to pricing, while "consortia" relate to product development and marketing strategies for export operations. 
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and the lack of a definitive precedent interpreting the scope of the protection provided by antitrust certification.
26
As discussed above, Australia, like the United States, has an explicit exemption along with a notification requirement. The ACCC can authorize an exemption if it feels there is a potential benefit that outweighs the potential harm.
27 Consistent with the U.S. trend, the annual Australian "authorizations" for export cartels have declined from a peak of sixty-nine in 1975 to just four in 2002. As of 1997, the ACCC reported that "over the years" it had received approximately 400 export agreement notifications. 28 The story is similar in Japan, where Table 1 shows that exemptions in force declined from 180 in 1973 to two in 1998 and zero in 1999. Germany shows a similar pattern in annual exemptions: 227 in 1972 to thirtysix in 1999.
These data provide, at best, only a partial answer to the question of how many export cartel exemptions antitrust authorities issue annually around the world. The available data suggest that such exemptions are still used, but that their number is rapidly declining. Since most countries do not require registration or notification, there is no way to measure whether the use of export associations themselves is declining, or whether they are still prevalent in countries where registration is not required.
II. THE POLICY DEBATE A. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
A growing number of policymakers argue that countries should abandon export cartel exemptions and replace them with cooperative, international antitrust enforcement. 29 There are four types of 39 There is precious little empirical work on the current composition of export cartels for the primary reason that government agencies either do not collect data on them or keep that data confidential. In general, even the data for countries that require notification "can be deceiving given the fact that there may be no requirement of compulsory notification when export agreements are abandoned and no requirements for reporting cartels or agreements which do not include any restrictions on domestic commerce."
40
Even when countries do report data on exemptions, they often aggregate it with data on other types of exemptions, making it impossible to disentangle information specifically about export cartels. Waller's analysis suggests that U.S. export cartels are no longer dominated by large multinational companies, or at least that a substantial number of ETCs are made up of relatively small firms. Of course, this conclusion only relates to the United States and cannot extend to other countries without further study.
The third argument against exemptions reflects concern about the effects of these laws, and elimination of these laws, on developing countries. At recent WTO meetings, developing country delegates articulated support for the elimination of export cartel exemptions in industrialized countries, while preserving this option for developing countries. At a 2002 meeting, Thailand argued that most export cartels damage the economies of developing countries and should be illegal; but developing countries should be exempt, since small exporters might need to join forces to increase bargaining power.
41
One year later, WTO representatives from Egypt and China made the same point, citing the need to pool resources as necessary to promote international trade. With respect to export cartels, the CBA Section has difficulty seeing how Canada, the U.S. or other jurisdictions could seek to preserve export cartel exemptions in the context of an FTAA with a meaningful competition policy component. The fact that this was not addressed in Chapter 15 of [the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")] is one of many reasons why more vigorous provisions on export cartels need to be explored.
43
The United States declined to repeal the WPA and ETC Act when asked to do so by trading partners in the mid-1990s. 44 Mexico specifically asked that these U.S. provisions be repealed, but the United States rejected this request. In fact, the final version of NAFTA specifically preserves these "safe havens" from U.S. antitrust law:
No changes in U.S. antitrust laws, including the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 or the Webb-Pomerene Act, will be required to implement U.S. obligations under the NAFTA. These laws have contributed to the the Egyptian representative said that "it was necessary to leave to [developing nations] the right to assist their local firms either directly, for example by granting them subsidies, or indirectly by allowing for mergers, acquisitions, export cartels, resource pooling or otherwise as each country deemed appropriate for its policy objectives"). At this same meeting, China stated it "shared the view that had been expressed by Thailand that the future multilateral framework on competition policy should incorporate restrictions on the maintenance of export cartels by developed country Members." Id. at 15. See generally Nareerat Wiriyapong, Easing of Competition Law Urged, THE NATION (THAILAND), Aug. 31, 1999 (reporting that academics "urged the government to relax the implementation of the Competition Law for export cartels in order to strengthen competitiveness of Thai exporters in international markets").
43 In the context of this growing criticism of export exemptions, and in an effort to eliminate trade frictions and encourage competition within the European Union ("EU"), the European Commission and many EU member states have eliminated explicit exemptions for export activity. In contrast, the United States has been one of the leading defenders of export cartel exemptions. However, these criticisms appear to have effected the promotion of export exemptions by U.S. officials. The United States' joint FTC/DOJ International Antitrust Guidelines changed between 1988 and 1995 to reflect the U.S. shift in policy toward more aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws against international cartels. Presumably reflecting the tension between the European position and the unchanged U.S. law allowing export cartels, the new guidelines give the exemptions a lower profile in its characterization of U.S. international antitrust policy. 46. Prominently featured in the first paragraph under "Enforcement Policy" in the 1988 Guidelines, the U.S. Department of Justice states that it "is not concerned with conduct that solely affects competition in foreign markets and could have no direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on competition and consumers in the United States." Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21584, 21586 (1988) . In the 1995 revision, the first paragraph under the new Section 3, "Threshold International Enforcement Issues," states:
Just as the acts of U.S. citizens in a foreign nation ordinarily are subject to the law of the country in which they occur, the acts of foreign citizens in the United States are subject to U.S. law. [T]hese arrangements typically were conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in effective export activity acting individually. As such, they often had pro-competitive effects in that they added another player to the relevant markets and might bring innovation or lower prices. Moreover, they were not secret and therefore did not bear the hallmarks of what was traditionally considered to be a hardcore cartel. 47 The U.S. position does reflect what little is known about the effects of current U.S. export exemptions on competition in world markets. Spencer Weber Waller's survey of the activities of ETCs concludes that most function as export intermediaries and service providers, not as horizontal agreements between competitors.
48 While recognizing the limited overall positive impact of these ETCs, Waller discounts the threat to competition posed by export exemptions:
The ETC Act does not create market power, nor does it create or maintain barriers to entry. It merely permits an industry, as a matter of U.S. law, to collusively exploit such market power abroad if it already exists. The history of the Webb-Pomerene Act suggests that few export associations will have sufficient global market power to exploit foreign markets.
49
In 1992, Andrew Dick came to a similar conclusion from his analysis of the Webb-Pomerene experience.
50
Global policy discussions and revisions, however, have continued despite limited 2005) . The "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" wording of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 can still be found in the guidelines, but it is placed instead at the end of the same paragraph. Id. 
III. STATUS OF EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS A. CURRENT STATUS
This section examines the current status of the law on export cartel exemptions for fifty-five countries, including the existence of reporting requirements (Table 2 ). This sample consists of all OECD countries, EU countries, and selected developing countries. An asterisk in Table 2 indicates a developing country. 51 We classify the legal treatment of export cartels into three groups: explicit exemptions, implicit exemptions and no statutory exemption. Explicit exemptions are created when a statute explicitly excludes export cartels from the substantive provisions regarding the scope of the antitrust law. Of the countries covered in Table 2 , seventeen have explicit exemptions. There are two types of explicit exemptions: those that require notification or authorization procedures, and those that do not. The notification procedures generally require businesses to apply for, and receive, permission from the government before, or concurrent with, participating in practices that may otherwise violate domestic antitrust law. Of the seventeen countries with explicit exemptions, six require notification.
Canadian competition law provides a good example of an explicit exemption without a notification requirement.
52 Under Canada's statutory scheme, combinations relating solely to the export of products from Canada are exempt from antitrust liability. However, Canadian exporters can lose their exemption if "the arrangement has resulted in or is likely to result in a reduction or limitation of the real 51. The categorization of developing countries is taken from the World Bank. See World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Country Groups (classifying developing countries into groups based on region, income, and indebtedness), available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) . The classification by income splits developing countries into three groups: low income (e.g., Armenia, India, Vietnam), lower-middle income (e.g., Albania, China, Thailand), and upper-middle income (e.g., Argentina, Czech Republic, Saudi Arabia). Id.
52. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 45(5) (1985) (Can.) (stating that export activity is exempt from conviction under the Competition Act).
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value of exports of a product." 53 Since there is no notification requirement, it is impossible to measure how many exporters have taken advantage of this exemption from antitrust liability. This is also the case in Iceland, where the law provides an explicit exemption without a notification requirement. 54 Iceland's legislature passed the law in 1993 and amended it several times since then, so its provisions are not simply a vestige of historical practice. 55 By contrast, Australia, like the United States, offers an explicit exemption for export cartels, but requires that firms satisfy a notification requirement to receive immunity. 56 This exemption protects "any provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding that relates exclusively to the export of goods from Australia, or to the supply of services outside Australia provided that particulars [of the agreement] are submitted to the [ACCC] within 14 days of the contract, arrangement or understanding being arrived at." 57 Australian competition law therefore provides for automatic immunity for export transactions on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 58 The ACCC explicitly excludes from exemption any agreement that relates to supply or pricing in the domestic market. Sherman Act 66 to make clear that it applies only to actions that harm the domestic market. 67 In doing so, the United States provided an implicit exemption, similar to those discussed below, for firms that engage in collusive conduct solely affecting the export market. Then Congress went further, creating a new explicit exemption. Under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, an exporter, group of exporters, or export intermediary can apply for a certificate of review stating that its export trade activity does not violate U.S. antitrust laws before they engage in cooperative activity directed at the export market.
68
The ETC Act includes provisions for written antitrust preclearance. The Department of Justice reviews each request for an "export trade certificate of review" before the Department of Commerce can grant such a certificate. 69 Issuance of an ETC certificate essentially eliminates the threat of governmental prosecution for antitrust violations. It shifts the burden of proof in any civil litigation to the litigant/accuser and limits any awards to single, rather than treble, damages in private antitrust actions. 70 The ETC Act also expanded the scope of U.S. exemptions beyond that provided in the WPA. It allows antitrust protection for export of services (rather than goods only), allows any person, partnership, or association to apply for a certificate of review (rather than associations only), and allows banks to participate in and to acquire [20:785
shares in an export trading company. 71 The ETC Act also differs from the WPA by establishing an office within the Department of Commerce both to oversee the granting of ETC certificates, and to promote the formation of export trading companies in the United States. 72 It is important to note that the ETC Act does not protect American export cartels from prosecution by other countries.
73 Firms are only eligible for an ETC exemption if their actions will have no effect on the domestic market. The cooperative activity must not harm domestic competition or create unfair competition for domestic competitors. 74 The ETC Act offers other benefits to certificate holders in civil litigation, including a shorter statute of limitations, presumption that certified conduct is lawful, and attorney's fees and costs for the prevailing party. 75 defense that they had immunity via their WP association and asserted that WebbPomerene associations were optional, not required, and thus, the principle of state non-interference did not hold). Bhattacharjea focuses on an analysis of the second relevant case, or more properly, global series of cases, involving the American Natural Soda Ash Corporation ("ANSAC"), a Webb-Pomerene association formed in 1983. Bhattacharjea analyzes ANSAC's legal battles with antitrust authorities in the European Union, India, South Africa, and Venezuela. Id. at 340-47. Despite initial failure, ANSAC's reformulation as the American-European Soda Ash Shipping Association ("AESASA") satisfied the European Commission's exemption requirements, but ANSAC continued to have problems in other countries and was unsuccessful in convincing any competition authority that the efficiency benefits of the association outweighed the potential for exercising market power. 
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An implicit exemption for export cartels exists when a national antitrust statute applies only to anticompetitive conduct affecting the domestic market. 76 Most countries in our sample (64%), including almost all members of the EU, have implicit exemptions. Such an exemption is granted by negative implication, since the scope of the antitrust law is limited, and does not explicitly mention behavior affecting foreign markets.
Ireland's competition law provides a typical example of an implicit exemption for export cartels. 77 The In some countries, there is no statutory exemption. This occurs when price fixing is illegal, and there is not an implicit exemption, because the antitrust statute simply does not define the geographic scope of the market, nor is there an explicit exemption allowing price fixing for export-oriented activity. This category includes Luxembourg, Russia, Thailand, and Uruguay. For example, Luxembourg's "Loi du 17 mai rélative a la concurrence" prohibits cartels and other activities that limit competition "sur le marché," but 
B. RECENT CHANGES IN EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there is both a lack of consistency across countries in how export cartels are treated and a lack of information on who has received exemptions and what kinds of activities they have engaged in. There does seem to be one clear trend, however, namely the elimination of explicit exemptions. Several countries have recently amended their competition laws to eliminate explicit export cartel exemptions. The countries instituting such changes are Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom ("UK"). Table 3 provides the dates of these reforms, as well as the form of the exemption policy change for each country. We discuss each country in turn.
One important force behind this trend is the push for convergence in competition policies across the member states of the EU. This is clearly seen in the recent modifications adopted by Cyprus and Hungary, which became members of the EU as of May 1, 2004. 81. Cf. Waller, U.S. Antitrust Ambivalence, supra note 2, at 109-10 (noting that in 1989, only four OECD countries -Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States -had mechanisms for registering export agreements). Thus, the changes in the antitrust policies of Japan, Germany, 
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Many of these countries had explicit exemptions in the past, but have changed their laws to parallel the EU's legislative framework. Similarly, Turkey, which had no competition law before 1994, and therefore no exemption for export cartels, has adopted a law that contains the same implicit exemption now common across EU countries.
83
The evolution of Germany's competition law is prototypical for European countries. Before a 1999 Amendment, the Act Against Restraints of Competition ("GWB") 84 allowed pure export cartel exemptions after the satisfaction of a notification requirement. 92. See id. The 1998 Competition Act replaces the need for registration with a general prohibition. Chapter I of the Act sets out the prohibition against agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which "may affect trade within the United Kingdom" and "have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the United Kingdom" (Section 2(1)).
Id.
93. Enterprise Act, c. 40, § § 188, 190 (2002) Practical enforcement of cartel prohibitions was virtually impossible under such a complicated framework of exemptions. 95 The British government recognized this problem in a Green Paper published in 1988.
96 There was also concern that the UK's former law was oriented towards the registration of anti-competitive cartels rather than the prevention of such cartels, that the prior laws did not provide for any meaningful methods of enforcement-such as retroactive penalties-and, finally, that the prior UK law did not require registration of an export cartel if only one company in the cartel agreed to restrict its conduct.
97
Competition law in the Netherlands and Sweden has also changed. As with several other countries mentioned above (e.g., Cyprus), these changes were driven by the desire for European convergence. Switzerland's decision to modify its law in 1995 was similarly motivated. REV. 237, 237 (1998) 
[20:785
Nevertheless, European convergence is not the sole factor driving these changes. Japan's policy has followed a similar path.
99 Like Germany, Japan has a long history of encouraging cooperation among its exporting firms. Before 1997, Japanese law permitted pure export cartels to enter into agreements on price, quantity, quality, or design, by notifying the Minister of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") within ten days of conclusion of the agreement. 100 MITI could limit the export exemption if the agreement: 1) violated Japanese treaties with foreign governments; 2) injured the interests of importers or Japanese export trade; 3) contained unjustly discriminatory content; 4) unjustly restricted participation in, or withdrawal from, the agreement; or 5) unjustly injured the interest of Japanese enterprises or consumers.
101
In the early 1990s, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") began to take "a tougher stance toward approving new exempted cartels, and tried to examine various legal requirements more rigidly so that no additional exempted cartels could be formed without convincing specific and urgent necessity."
102 Although cartels in general, and export cartels in particular, used to be thought of in Japan as a "useful tool to eliminate excessive competition," the JFTC began a systematic overview of, and elimination of, its cartel exemptions.
103 Between 1992 and [r]emaining export cartels, related either to related efforts culminated in the passage of the Omnibus Act to Repeal and Reform Cartels and Other Systems Exempted from the Application of the Antimonopoly Act under Various Laws ("Omnibus Act"), which repealed the previous explicit exemption for export cartels, as well as twenty-nine of the thirty-five other criteria for receiving exemption from antitrust liability. 106 Similarly, in 1999, Korea passed the Act on Regulating Undue Concerted Activities from the Application of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act ("Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act") "in order to facilitate the market economy and keep up with international trends by repealing or improving cartels permitted under individual statutes."
107 By this time, Korea, like Japan, had already abolished most export cartels. In addition, Korea took steps toward a more general deregulation of import and export processes. A report by the OECD noted the following:
Until 1999, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) had far-reaching authority to "maintain order" in the import and export market. In February 1999, the Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act limited MOCIE's co-ordinating power to exports of military equipment and compliance with inter-governmental agreements. Moreover, the same Act abolished the power of the Minister of Construction and Transportation to co-ordinate bidding in foreign markets (KFTC 1999a, §19) . 108 protection of quality or intellectual property, or to import monopolies in partner countries are to be abolished by end-1999"), available through http://docsonline.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) .
106. See Fair Trade Comm'n of Japan, About the JFTC: Role of the JFTC: What Practices are Subject to Control by the Antimonopoly? (documenting the effects of the Omnibus Act on export cartel exemptions), at http://www2.jftc.go.jp/epage/aboutjftc/role/q-3.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) ; see also World Trade Org., Trade Policy Review of Japan, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/107, 9, ¶ 65 (October 9, 2002) ("There are no authorized export cartels in Japan. However, 22 types of cartel [sic] are exempted from general prohibition of cartels under Japan's AntiMonopoly Act (section (5)(vii)).").
107. See Int'l Bar Ass'n, The Global Competition Forum, available at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/asia.htm#korea (last visited Mar. 3, 2005 This trend toward the elimination of explicit exemptions, as well as reductions in the number of exemptions granted, reflects an admirable attempt to make competition law and policy more internally consistent. Many countries have been taking a much more aggressive attitude toward both domestic and international cartels that harm domestic competition. Under such circumstances, policies to promote exactly the same kind of activities outside one's borders seem logically inconsistent and contrary to the spirit of international cooperation. These policy changes reflect the views of scholars such as Spencer Weber Waller, who wrote fifteen years ago:
The idea of the notification and registration of export cartels on an international basis is equally tempting but flawed. Transparency is a valued goal, but it is of use, first and foremost, as a tool in the detection and eradication of anticompetitive restraints and should not be used as a justification for their perpetuation . . . the best hope [is] that the national export cartel will eventually join its discredited cousin, the traditional international cartel, as an improper distortion of competition in international trade subject to universal condemnation and prohibition.
109
The impact of these policy changes, however, is less obvious. Because countries have converged on language that restricts enforcement to activities that harm domestic competition, the legal status of export cartels is now more, not less, ambiguous. In addition, less information exists regarding who participates in joint export activities and where they target their activities. The questions, then, are what would be an ideal competition policy with respect to joint export activity and what kinds of enforcement mechanisms could move us toward such a policy? There are essentially two types of alternatives: the adoption of extraterritorial policies by national governments or increased international cooperation. In some ways, the most obvious resolution is the extraterritorial option: individual nation states could ban any activity for export that is already prohibited if targeted at the domestic market. There are obvious problems with any extraterritorial solution, so we believe that increased international cooperation is the preferred and more effective solution. This cooperation could be informal, as undertaken by the International Competition Network. Support for this
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E XPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS 813 cooperation could also come from more information sharing among competition authorities so that those nations adversely affected by export cartels have the resources to respond. The strongest form of international cooperation would be an international competition authority with jurisdiction over collusive activity aimed at foreign markets.
On the one hand, as we move toward more fully integrated global markets, there is less reason to distinguish at all between domestic cooperative activity and the same sort of activity aimed at exports.
110
If we have a general consensus that price fixing harms consumers, then export exemptions benefit a nation only to the extent that they harm foreign consumers. The policy is one of enriching oneself at the expense of one's trading partners. A multilateral agreement to eliminate these exemptions and treat price fixing the same wherever it occurs, or in whatever market is targeted, would improve global consumer welfare.
On the other hand, international cooperation and truly effective competition policy requires respect for both national sovereignty and differences in levels of development and the strength of domestic competition across nation states. The real problem with a global ban on "export cartels," whether achieved through international cooperation or through the harmonization of domestic laws, is that it ignores the unintended effects of such a policy. For many small firms, especially from countries that have historically been less involved in global markets, entry into global markets is an overwhelming challenge. Cooperation among firms that increases the number of participants in global markets makes competition more, not less, effective. Especially for smaller countries, where the alternative to a cooperative association is merger, elimination of cooperation as a legal possibility could lead to consolidation and the lessening of competition in the domestic market. WTO, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 19 (2003) , available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20844_wps2917.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) .
111. See Bhattacharjea, supra note 73, at 341-52 (discussing the impact of the elimination of export cartels on developing countries); see also Ajit Singh,
Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development
We have seen exactly this kind of "unintended consequence" as a result of the increased prosecution of "hard core" international cartels.
112 For example, since the 1995 break up of a cartel among producers of seamless steel tubes, the industry has substantially reorganized. Every single former member of the cartel has either exited the industry altogether, or joined in a merger or strategic alliance with another former cartel member. The industry is more consolidated, and it is hard to see how competition could be more intense under the current industry structure than the earlier, explicitly collusive, one.
113
International cooperation provides an alternative that, if wisely implemented, could limit the negative effects of collusion on international markets without providing a regulatory incentive to merger for small firms, especially in small or developing countries.
114
Such an agreement could require that competition officials meet a higher standard to show that the cooperative activity did in fact harm competition in some markets rather than the per se standard, which 114. See Victor, supra note 1, at 581 (proposing a number of provisions that one might include in a multilateral agreement on export cartels to allow for efficiency enhancing ventures, and yet create more elaborate checks and balances to anticompetitive ventures). For example, Victor recommends association registration, increased sharing of information across countries, and increased prosecution. Id. at 579-81; see Bhattacharjea, supra note 73, at 355-57 (advocating a similar position, but suggesting the use of anti-dumping rules at the WTO as the enforcement mechanism, although modified to deal with "over-pricing" by foreign cartels).
has become more common in the national laws of most high-income countries. This policy would recognize that export associations may provide essential resources to overcome barriers to entry to export markets, and therefore, increase the competitiveness of international markets.
115 Rules should be established to give firms guidance as to whether their activity is likely to meet international competition standards, since one of the benefits of national export exemptions is providing legitimate marketing associations with assurance that they would not face domestic legal liability. A stronger policy would place the burden of proof on export associations to show that they need to cooperate in order to participate effectively in international markets and that their activities indeed do not undermine competition.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to have more uniform pro-competition policies, many countries have chosen to eliminate or restrict the exemptions that they provide to export cartels. Seventeen of the fifty-five countries surveyed here do offer firms exemption from domestic antitrust laws for export activity. Thirty-four provide no exemption from antitrust laws for export activity, but exempt such activity implicitly because their competition laws are silent on restrictive activities that affect foreign markets. Within the last decade, at least ten countries have rewritten their laws, moving from explicit exemptions to this more passive policy of speaking only to the domestic market. However, the construction of domestic antitrust laws that only ban activity that harms domestic competition leaves a vacuum in which export cartels can continue to operate with no obvious or practical institution to provide oversight or prosecution of their activities. Further, the elimination of reporting requirements has reduced the information available concerning the activities of these cooperative ventures among firms.
However, this is not to argue that we should revert to national exemptions that seem to legitimize anti-competitive behavior that is [20:785 strongly condemned if conducted in domestic markets. Instead, we suggest that international cooperation to regulate and prosecute cooperative activity affecting international markets could rationalize these policies and promote competition more effectively than the current haphazard set of national laws. Especially if it includes consideration of both market structure and barriers to entry into international markets, international cooperation could help competition authorities develop the dual capacity to detect and prevent associations that undermine competition, and provide assurance, reduced risk, and consistency for firms that cooperate, but do not undermine competition. This would provide a more coherent set of rules for firms than the current patchwork of export exemptions. It could also provide flexibility reflecting the different needs and levels of development of different countries without abandoning the principles of competition. 
